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Research Questions 
• Q1: Do defense contractors earn excessive 
profits at the expense of taxpayers? 
 








Do Defense Contractors Earn Excessive Profits? 
 • No consensus among academics, government, elected representatives, 
and the industry. 
 
• The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), has consistently insisted that “ 
Defense industry profitability lags significantly behind its industry peers.” 
 
• A General Accounting Office (GAO) report in 1980s found that defense 
contractors normally earned a higher Return On  Assets (ROA) than their 
commercial counterparts. 
 
• In 2009, a Department of Defense (DoD) sponsored project carried out by 
the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) confirms that the operating margin 
of defense industry is lower than that of other sectors. However, the profit 
is “adequate” to sustain defense industry firms because they enjoy a more 
favorable financing structure. 
 
• What does the academic literature (assuming academics are relatively 
independent and hence are less subject to a conflict-of-interest problem) 





The Literature Review on the Excessive 
Profits of Defense Contractors 
• Early evidence was mixed.  
    Weidenbaum (1968), Bohi (1973),  
     Agapos and Galloway (1970), Stigler and Friedland (1971). 
 
• The studies in the 1980s and 1990s are less divided in that generally they 
support the proposition that defense industries earn higher profits than 
their non-defense peers. 
     Carrington (1986), Trueger (1991), Lichtenberg (1992).  
 
• The major explanation of the excessive profits is the cost-shifting 
hypothesis, though a more recent 2002 study casts doubt on the validity 
of this explanation. 
     Rogerson (1992), Thomas and Tung (1992). McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) 
 
• The academic studies on the profitability of defense contractors almost 
stopped after 1990s, leaving an almost two decade blank. 
      
 
4 
The Objective of This Paper 
• First, we fill in an almost two-decade gap that was left blank 
by the literature, i.e., we use up-to-date data to investigate 
whether defense contractors earn excessive profits. Our 
contribution to this goal is beyond a pure extension of 
timeline. Namely, we employ an innovative industry-year-size 
matched excessive profit measure to better capture the 
“excess” of the defense contractors’ profitability. 
 
• Secondly, given that we have found the evidence supporting 
the existence of excessive profits and the lack of consensus on 
the explanations of excessive profits, we provide alternative 




• fedspending.org: Top 500 recipients (by dollar 
awarded) of defense contract awards for year 
2008. 
 
• 112 publically traded firms, covering 24 




• 4,099 sample firm-years during 1950-2010 
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Of which we find 
Using stock tickers to map into the Compustat database 
Research Design: Measuring Excessive Profits 
What Does Not Make Sense? 
• A very common and seemingly sensible method is to compare the profitability 
measures of defense contractors with similar measures of the member firms of 
an index.  
Figure 1: Defense Industry Operating Margin— 
the Lowest Returns Amongst Its Peers (Reproduced from AIA report) 
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Critique of “Defense vs. S&P Index “ Approach 
Why Not Make Sense? 
• Q: What implications concerning defense contractors’ excessive profits, if any, can be drawn from 
the Figure 1?  
     
 
 
• It’s meaningless to use a very broadly defined index as the benchmark for inferring the defense 
contractors’ normal profitability. The defense contractors, as a whole or as individual firms, and the 
broad market, are two different animals.  
 
• Even a narrowly defined index, such as a manufacturing index, is also problematic. The bottom line 
is: the defense contractors span a wide range of industries. For instance, our 112 public U.S. firms 
on the 2008 top 500 list cover 24 unique 2-digit-SIC codes. If measured by 4-digit-SIC codes, the 
number goes up to 56 industries!  
 
• As pointed out by McGahan and Porter (2002), profitability is very industry-specific. Different 
industries have different risk exposures, competitions, and entry barriers, among many others. 
Therefore given the wide industry representation of defense contractors, the correct benchmark for 
inferring defense contractors’ normal profitability (and hence excessive profitability) must focus on 
the individual firm level.  
 
• There is no one-size-fits-all benchmark, not the S&P, not a manufacturing index, not any readily 
available index.  
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Our answer: None! 
Research Design: Measuring Excessive Profits 
What Does Make Sense? 
• Based on the theoretical literature, we propose 
an industry-year-size matched measure to assess 
the excessive profitability of defense contractors.  
McGahan and Porter (2002) document the 
importance of year and industry on accounting 
profitability.  
Extensive literature demonstrates that firm size 
should be considered in constructing a benchmark for 
comparison (Albuquerque 2009, Dechow, Hutton, and 
Sloan 1996).  
Hence, we devise an industry-year-size matched 
excessive profit measure for each individual firm-year 
and in turn use it as the basis for analyzing our 
research questions.  
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Measuring Excessive Profits:  
Industry-Year-Size Matched Proxy 
• For each of the 4,099 firm-years, we try to find a 
benchmark firm-year whose profit becomes the proxy for 
“normal profit” of the firm-year investigated. 
 
• Specifically, we go to the same industry-year where 
industry membership is defined as 4-digit SIC codes, and 
identify the non-defense (i.e., not on our 112-firm list) firm 
that has the best size match (where size is alternatively 
defined as either total assets or total revenue) with our 
defense firm-year. 
 
• The difference between the profit of the firm-year 
investigated and the profit of the benchmark firm-year will 
be the measure of “excessive profit”. 
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Empirical Results 
• Table 5 The Excessive Profitability of 4,099 
Firm-Years during 1950-2010 
    Panel A: Size matched by Total Assets 
     
 




  N Mean Min Max Std Dev t P-value 
Excessive ROA(%) 3,809 1.12 -23.49 44.17 7.08 9.77**** <0.0001 
Excessive ROCE(%) 3,314 3.65 -143.64 175.57 25.73 8.08**** <0.0001 
Excessive PMR(%) 3,809 0.28 -31.82 74.56 7.87 2.22** 0.03 
Excessive OMR(%) 3,777 -0.09 -59.59 257.33 10.32 -0.52 0.60 
  N Mean Min Max Std Dev t P-value 
Excessive ROA(%) 3,825 1.04 -21.89 44.37 7.29 8.80**** <0.0001 
Excessive ROCE(%) 3,246 3.71 -142.09 178.70 26.08 8.10**** <0.0001 
Excessive PMR(%) 3,825 0.45 -31.82 74.91 7.23 3.85*** 0.0001 
Excessive OMR(%) 3,793 0.35 -48.23 69.29 7.80 2.77*** 0.006 
Empirical Results (cont’d) 









Dependent Variable: Industry-Year-Size Matched Excessive Profit 

















Intercept  0.0072 0.0505 -0.0003 -0.0034 0.0048 0.0589 -0.0009 0.0012 


















Empirical Results (cont’d) 
• Table 7  The Excessive Profitability and 
Corporate Governance 






Dependent Variable: Industry-Year-Size Matched Excessive Profit 

















Intercept  0.0097 0.0528 0.0003 -0.0041 0.0087 0.0491 0.0015 -0.0005 
CEO-Chairman  






















































Summary of Major Findings 
• First, when compared with their industry peers, defense contractors 
earn excessive profits. This result is evident when profit is measured 
by Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Common Equity (ROCE), and 
Profit Margin Ratio (PMR). The evidence of excessive profit is less 
consistent if profit is measured by Operating Margin Ratio (OMR).  
 
• Secondly, defense contractors’ excessive profit is more pronounced 
after 1992, consistent with the conjecture that the post-1992 
significant industry consolidation enabled superior profitability due 
to both the improved bargaining power and increased political 
influence of the newly combined firms.  
 
• Finally, defense contractors’ excessive profitability increases with 
poorer corporate governance, as measured by the duality of the 





         Questions? Comments? Suggestions? 
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